<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><rss xmlns:atom='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' version='2.0'><channel><atom:id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221</atom:id><lastBuildDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 03:57:44 +0000</lastBuildDate><title>the blog @ angasm.org</title><description/><link>http://angasm.org/</link><managingEditor>Ang</managingEditor><generator>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>66</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-6914558438596338667</guid><pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 03:46:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2008-04-10T23:57:44.717-04:00</atom:updated><title>3ware 9650se with Tyan i5400xt (S5396)</title><description>Just for the record: the 3ware 9650SE-8LPML PCI-Express RAID card will work with the Tyan Tempest i5400xt motherboard.  And, Windows Vista Ultimate x64 will automatically download and install drivers for the card.  (I don't boot from the RAID, so installation is somewhat easier).  Everything works flawlessly, and I'm getting close to 600mb/sec writes to a RAID 6 array (using 8x300GB Maxtor 7200rpm SATA drives).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You will, however, need a recently updated firmware.  3ware has a &lt;a href="http://www.3ware.com/KB/article.aspx?id=15103"&gt;knowledgebase article&lt;/a&gt; about this.  The card I bought off ebay was manufactured in December 2006, and the system would not POST with the card installed.  3ware processed an RMA for me and sent me a replacement manufactured in January 2008, which worked flawlessly with the motherboard.</description><link>http://angasm.org/2008/04/3ware-9650se-with-tyan-i5400xt-s5396.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-1570309649163477632</guid><pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2008 22:12:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2008-04-10T22:37:52.223-04:00</atom:updated><title>Video settings for DLA-G11 on Intel G35 graphics</title><description>It's spring break so I finally have a weekend to deal with computer upgrades.  My system is now running off a brand-new ASUS motherboard, the &lt;a href="http://www.asus.com/products.aspx?modelmenu=1&amp;model=1912&amp;l1=3&amp;l2=11&amp;l3=584&amp;l4=0"&gt;P5E-VM HDMI&lt;/a&gt;.  This motherboard is perfect for home theater applications, as it provides Vista-capable integrated video (through an &lt;a href="http://www.intel.com/products/chipsets/g35/index.htm"&gt;Intel G35 Express&lt;/a&gt; chipset) with dual outputs: an HDMI port for digital panels and an HD-15 port for analog monitors.  There's a big discussion of this over at &lt;a href="http://www.avsforum.com/avs-vb/showthread.php?t=938473"&gt;AVS Forum&lt;/a&gt;.  (I am, however, sticking with XP.)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Unfortunately, &lt;a href="http://www.entechtaiwan.com/util/ps.shtm"&gt;Powerstrip&lt;/a&gt; does not work with Intel video, and I have always depended on Powerstrip to create the custom resolution needed to obtain pixel-perfect output to my JVC DLA-G11 projector.  The projector runs at a wacky 1360x1024 resolution; if the settings are off just by a little bit, parts of the screen get chopped off.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The solution is a piece of software called &lt;a href="http://www.clevertec.co.uk/productsfree.htm#dtdcalc"&gt;DTD Calculator&lt;/a&gt;.  Here's how to get it to work.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;OL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Download and install the newest video drivers from Intel's website&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Set "Graphics Options--&amp;gt;Output to--&amp;gt;Intel(R) Dual Display Clone--&amp;gt;Digital Display+Monitor"&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Input the following parameters down the boxes on the left:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pixel Clock (MHz)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;139.208&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;H Active Pixels&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1360&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;H Start of Sync Pulse&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1464&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;H End of Sync Pulse&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1608&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;H End of Blanking Interval&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1824&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;V Active Lines&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1024&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;V Start of Sync Pulse&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1025&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;V End of Sync Pulse&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1028&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;V End of Blanking Interval&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;1060&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;(Leave "Interlaced" unchecked)&lt;br /&gt;Sync Profile&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;+hsync +vsync&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Finally, click on "Registry Hack", "More", "Get Calculated", and then "Write DTDs to the Registry".&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/OL&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Once you reboot, you should have a new "1360x1024" resolution selectable.  That should  match perfectly with your DLA-G11 or G15 projector.  Make sure the projector is connected to the VGA out port, and the input is selected to SXGA3.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The values, by the way, were extracted from Powerstrip....</description><link>http://angasm.org/2008/03/video-settings-for-dla-g11-on-intel-g35.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-38657775053851837</guid><pubDate>Sun, 21 Oct 2007 03:40:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-10-20T23:44:54.089-04:00</atom:updated><title>Clever Commercial...</title><description>&lt;object width="425" height="366"&gt;&lt;param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/2mTLO2F_ERY&amp;rel=1&amp;border=0"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;param name="wmode" value="transparent"&gt;&lt;/param&gt;&lt;embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/2mTLO2F_ERY&amp;rel=1&amp;border=0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" width="425" height="366"&gt;&lt;/embed&gt;&lt;/object&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/10/fun-commercial.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-4119884286810081233</guid><pubDate>Sun, 09 Sep 2007 19:54:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-09-09T16:44:53.368-04:00</atom:updated><title>Pop Music</title><description>I've been spending some time listening to the Billboard "Hot 100": the top 100 songs of the year, as ranked by Billboard Magazine.  The archive I'm listening to includes the Hot 100 from 1959 to 2006, and the Hot 50 from 1947 to 1958.  Yes, that's almost 60 years of music, over 5000 tracks.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The archive contains pretty much every pop song you're likely to have encountered through heavy radio play.  As an exercise, I decided to go through the entire archive and flag "significant" songs.  A song is "significant" for me if 1) it's one of those songs that conjures memories for me, or 2) I like the song.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The result is a list of about 1600 songs.  They break down as follows:&lt;br /&gt;1947-1959: 54 songs&lt;br /&gt;1960-1969: 144 songs&lt;br /&gt;1970-1979: 236 songs&lt;br /&gt;1980-1989: 417 songs&lt;br /&gt;1990-2000: 525 songs&lt;br /&gt;2000-2006: 251 songs&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The 2000s are not yet finished, but if you extrapolate (divide 251 by 7/10, which is 358), you see a substantial decline from the 80s and 90s.  It seems correct to conclude that I'm most familiar with (and I enjoy most) "pop" music in the 80s and 90s, and that I'm getting less familiar with (and I enjoy less) pop music from 2000 and beyond.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What's the best explanation for this?  Most probably, it's because I cared a lot more about music in the 80s and 90s (when I was growing up: high school was 88-92 for me), and therefore I have many more memories strongly connected with pop music from those years.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Basically, what this means is that I'm getting old....</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/09/pop-music.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-9115187750761822154</guid><pubDate>Mon, 27 Aug 2007 14:30:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-08-27T21:27:43.334-04:00</atom:updated><title>Canon DR-2580C document scanner</title><description>&lt;p align=center&gt;&lt;img src="/bpics/dr-2580c.jpg"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;At the beginning of the month, I had about 10,000 photocopied pages of material that I wanted to keep but didn't have room for.  (This is a consequence of moving into an apartment just over half the size of our previous.)  The logical choice was to scan everything and throw away the hard copies, so I started researching high-speed scanners.  I settled on the Canon DR-2580c.  It's been a long time since I've been so satisfied with a technology purchase.  I highly recommend the scanner.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It goes for $644 at scantastik.com.  Mine arrived two days after I ordered it (shipped from Pennsylvania).  It was easy to set up, and the software was fairly easy to use.  The unit is rated to scan 25 pages per minute at 200dpi in black/white mode, but 1) it scans both front and back at once and 2) it scans at 300 dpi, both with zero speed decrease. (It also can scan in color, though at a significant speed decrease.)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What's great about the scanner is that it &lt;i&gt;just works&lt;/i&gt;.  You load up to 50 pages into the document feed and just let it go.  Two minutes later, you load another 50 pages an hit continue: the software appends the new pages to the ongoing PDF file it is creating.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The software can detect page orientation, and it can detect blank pages (so you can load single-sided documents along with double-sided documents and it'll figure out what scans to keep), but I turned off all those features because they slow down the scanning.  Instead, I am using Adobe Acrobat Standard (version 8 is bundled with the scanner) to post-process the files---Acrobat detects orientation and does OCR on the pages to enable full-text search.  The full-text content is kept as an invisible overlay on the original image, so all formatting and images remain.  This processing goes slowly---it takes 2-4 seconds per page on my 3GHz, single-core Pentium 4.  But it's not a big deal because I just batch the jobs overnight.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The system has an ultrasonic multi-feed detection system which determines with very high accuracy when the paper feed system sucks in more than one page at a time.  I found this happened about three times in the 10,000 pages I scanned.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Not everything is perfect, though.  The document feeder is not all that good at keeping pages aligned perfectly as they go into the scanner, so the pages tend to come out somewhat skewed.  (I think Adobe can correct this in post-processing; I'll have to check it out some more).  And feeding in spiral-bound reading packets can be difficult: hole-punched pages can get caught on one another, causing severe skewing and mis-feeds.  I found a way to finesse the feeding process so the pages untangle themselves, but it involved my actively attending to document feeder as it scanned.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At $644, I think the device is a great deal.  The only consumables with this scanner are the rollers in the document feeders, which must be replaced after every 10,000 pages: this costs $50.  The main thing I'd want to improve is the alignment on the paper feeding.  I expect the Xerox Documate 252 is the closest competitor to the Canon---it's also a 25 page per minute/50 images per minute document scanner.  It costs $100 more at scantastik.com; if it has a markedly superior feeder, that might be worth it.  Keep in mind, though, that the Canon is very compact and weighs about four pounds: you can easily carry it around.  If portability is at all an issue for you, the Canon is the obvious choice.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PS: I found I could successfully load 100 pages into the paper feeder (double the rated amount) with no troubles, as long as I actively attended to the feeding process to ensure skewing was at a minimum....</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/08/canon-dr-2580c-document-scanner.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-3446340856988631059</guid><pubDate>Fri, 13 Jul 2007 06:10:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-07-19T10:39:12.800-04:00</atom:updated><title>Tips for the Tufts Philosophy MA Comps</title><description>I've encountered two very different perspectives on comp exams among faculty at Tufts.  The first takes the exams to measure one's broad mastery of a field.  The second takes the exams to measure one's ability to become familiarized with a philosophical topic in short order.  If the first is correct, last-minute studying &lt;i&gt;should not&lt;/i&gt;, in general, be sufficient to pass a comp.  If the second is correct, last-minute studying &lt;i&gt;should&lt;/i&gt;, in general, be sufficient to pass a comp.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I believe that last-minute studying &lt;i&gt;is&lt;/i&gt; generally sufficient for passing comps.  If I'm right, you can start studying at the time you get the comp questions---which is 48 hours before the time you have to take the comp---and still have a very good chance of passing.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article gives some advice on how to pull this off.&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Be prepared to &lt;i&gt;completely ignore&lt;/i&gt; some study questions.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt;Only nine of the twelve questions you're given will appear on the comp.  Since they're grouped in sets of three, you can skip two questions and still be &lt;i&gt;certain&lt;/i&gt; that you'll have enough answers no matter how the questions are arranged in sections.  Here's what happens if you skip more than two.  The following lists the probability that you'll have answers to handle all test sections (these numbers were calculated by Dustin Feigerle---I haven't checked them yet):&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 3: 98.64%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 4: 94.55%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 5: 86.36%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 6: 73.05%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 7: 54.55%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 8: 32.73%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Skip 9: 12.27%&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;  I had good results skipping 4-5 questions on each comp.  Ignoring questions is extremely important because it frees up precious time to study for the &lt;i&gt;other&lt;/i&gt; questions.  I also found it difficult to remember everything I wanted to say when I prepared more than eight answers.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Be strategic about which questions you skip.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt;  Ignore questions which you find to be hard to research.  Try to identify which questions overlap in content and focus on finding answers for those---you make best use of research time when a single article covers more than one question.  Try to find resources which directly address the exact question being asked (e.g., SEP on &lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-modal/"&gt;fictionalism about possible worlds&lt;/a&gt;, or SEP on &lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/"&gt;Nietzsche's critique of morality&lt;/a&gt;).  And be careful about ignoring too many questions of a single type.  For instance, recent ethics comps have devoted an entire section to three questions about the position of important historical figures (e.g., Hume, Kant and Nietzsche).  According to the above probabilities, you have a really great chance of coming out OK if you just skip three questions (over 98%).  But if the three questions you skipped were the "history" questions on the Ethics comp, your actual chances of coming out OK will be &lt;i&gt;much&lt;/i&gt; worse.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Do not try for excellence or originality.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt;  You aren't awarded for brilliance in comp exams.  (Put the effort into getting A+'s in your classes instead.)  Your goal in the comps is to pass.  And passing requires zero originality or creativity.  Don't make your answers too involved.  You'll have to remember 7-8 answers to pass the comp; if your answers are too detailed, you'll start to forget what you wanted to say.  The important thing is to touch on major issues.  Explain why the question seems interesting to some philosophers, talk about the most important approaches, and argue for one of them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Tufts professors are telling the truth when they say that performance on comps does not factor into how they assess students for PhD program recommendations.  I had failed one comp (metaphysics) and passed none when I applied for PhD programs, and I had &lt;a href="/2007/04/philosophy-phd-programs.html"&gt;no problem getting in&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By the way, I think I failed metaphysics because I tried to do something original, and I also tried to be sophisticated, using &lt;i&gt;Philosopher's Index&lt;/i&gt; and working off of research articles in prestigious journals.  That clearly didn't work, and I switched to these methods, passing the rest of my attempts: Metaphysics and Phil. Science in January; Ethics and Epistemology in May.  Since all the studying you are doing is just last minute, you can try two---perhaps even three---comps at a time and have a reasonable chance of passing all of them.  Though be prepared for some exhaustion.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Stick with encyclopedias or textbooks when possible.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt; The three critical skills for passing comps via last-minute studying are 1) the ability to find a paper that directly addresses the question, 2) the ability to read a paper and understand it very quickly, and 3) the ability to identify the most important philosophical issues raised by the question.  Encyclopedias are the easiest to search, especially online encyclopedias.  They are (relatively) easy to read.  And since they are usually brief, they already focus on the most important issues.  I suggest the &lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/"&gt;Stanford Encyclopedia&lt;/a&gt;, the &lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/"&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia&lt;/a&gt;, and Borchert's 2006 update of the &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.  (Unfortunately Tufts doesn't seem to have a copy of the 2006 EoP.  Someone should request the library to buy one or subscribe to it online.  They are likely to be responsive.  Tufts didn't subscribe to the online Routledge Encyclopedia until I made a request to the library.)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Take or audit the class before the comp.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt; Yes, you can pass the comps just by studying at the last minute, but that assumes a level of competence---being able to quickly understand the articles you read and identify the most important points.  You might not get many direct answers for comp questions by doing the reading for and sitting through Ethics, Epistemology and Metaphysics.  But the classes &lt;i&gt;will&lt;/i&gt; give you skills you need to best use the 48 hours you have to study. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Try my guides&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt; I've begun to collect answers for comp questions.  I have (spotty) coverage for the three required comps plus phil. science.  If you find useful resources, please write a comment to let me know: I'm actively editing these pages. &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-philosophy-of-science-comp.html"&gt;Philosophy of Science&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-metaphysics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Metaphysics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-epistemology-comp-answers.html"&gt;Epistemology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-ethics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Ethics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Take the comps in the spring&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/li&gt; There is, of course, no official line on this, but it does seem that if people are trying to graduate, the grading on the comps will be somewhat more lenient.  Of course, some comps taken in the spring still fail, but it seems easier to pass in the spring.&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Good luck!</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/07/tips-for-tufts-philosophy-ma-comps.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-9127254509830600748</guid><pubDate>Fri, 29 Jun 2007 03:18:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-06-29T05:30:54.429-04:00</atom:updated><title>Moving!</title><description>We've been looking for a place to live in the New York area for almost three months now.  The search is finally over.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After a 14 and 1/2 hour flight from Hong Kong, Karen and I arrived in Newark, NJ to find that our connecting flight to Boston had been canceled.  The airline found a flight for us the next day and put us up in a hotel for the night.  This gave us an extra day in the New York area.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I was able to sleep a bit at the hotel, but woke up at 2am due to jet lag and started surfing craigslist.  One listing stood out: a 1 bedroom with a small "den" on the corner of 1st and Hudson in Hoboken.  I called the agent at 8am, got a call-back at 10am, and we arrived at the unit at 11:45am.  The apartment seemed a great fit for us, so we went ahead and signed the lease.  We hopped back onto the PATH and got back to Newark with ample time to catch our 3:20pm connecting flight to Boston.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I find that housing in New York arouses strong emotions from many people.  Many have discouraged us from choosing New Jersey, for various reasons.  We're choosing this place mainly because of its location: about 680 ft from the Hoboken PATH station.  The commute to NYU consists of 1) the 700-ft walk to the PATH, 2) a wait for a train, 3) a 10-minute train ride and 4) a 1/2-mile walk from the corner of 9th St. and 6th Ave. to the philosophy department.  I think that, door-to-door, the commute will typically be 20-25 minutes.  I hope this proves correct.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The rents are also lower in Hoboken, which allows us to afford to keep a car, so I can drive to Rutgers and Princeton for classes.  Hopefully, this means I'll be able to take full advantage of amazing philosophy resources in the New York Consortium.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Anyways, my stress level has decreased significantly now that the housing seems to be taken care of.  We will move to Hoboken on August 1.  Karen and I will be in Texas for the month of July.  We look forward to seeing old friends again there.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So sometimes, canceled flights can be a good thing!  A &lt;i&gt;very&lt;/i&gt; good thing, indeed!</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/06/moving.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-6625184535504488929</guid><pubDate>Sat, 09 Jun 2007 02:38:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-06-08T23:12:09.016-04:00</atom:updated><title>Nintendo DS and the R4 in Hong Kong</title><description>Since I so thoroughly enjoyed the Nintendo DS game &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elite_Beat_Agents"&gt;Elite Beat Agents&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;, I thought I'd try to find the Japanese sequel that was just released last month, &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moero%21_Nekketsu_Rhythm_Damashii_Osu%21_Tatakae%21_Ouendan_2"&gt;燃えろ！熱血リズム魂　押忍！闘え！応援団２&lt;/a&gt;.  My search took me to the computer bazaar in &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sham_Shui_Po"&gt;Sham Shui Po&lt;/a&gt; in Kowloon, Hong Kong.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The game, unfortunately, is in fairly high demand in Hong Kong and was sold out everywhere I looked.  What's notable, though, are the suggestions of the shop-owners I spoke with: they recommended getting an &lt;a href="http://www.r4ds.com/"&gt;R4&lt;/a&gt; cartridge and downloading the game.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The R4 is a flash cart that plugs into slot-1 on the Nintendo DS (slot-1 is the smaller, DS-specific game slot).  The R4 itself has a slot for a micro-SD card, and it allows you to play downloaded Nintendo DS ROMS.  A quick online search revealed over 1100 ROMS available---and the Japanese game I was looking for was one of the available ROMS.  The R4 plays the downloaded ROM flawlessly.  It sells for under HK$180, which is less than US$25.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It is not all that surprising that such piracy devices exist.  What is striking is the fact that Hong Kong &lt;i&gt;shop-owners&lt;/i&gt; are themselves recommending that their customers use the devices.  Of course, this is in response to requests for obscure import games that are in such demand that they are sold out---but I get the feeling that one reason such games are sold out is because shops are choosing not to carry them, expecting that their customers will download the games and thus will not be looking to buy them....</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/06/nintendo-ds-and-r4-in-hong-kong.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-4837239105149021450</guid><pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2007 21:52:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-05-16T17:57:12.056-04:00</atom:updated><title>Graduating!</title><description>Due to what I know must be a sizable measure of grace on the part of my examiners and professors, I've passed all my exams and classes and will be graduating with a master's in philosophy from Tufts this Sunday!  This will make me a BSMAMA, (pronounced bees-mah-mah, as I stipulate).  Karen still beats me, though: she's a BAMAMAMA (bah-mah-mah-mah), with three masters degrees...</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/05/graduating.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-3664802763809791771</guid><pubDate>Thu, 10 May 2007 19:05:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-05-14T08:08:28.315-04:00</atom:updated><title>New York Housing</title><description>Karen and I are trying to figure out where we should live when we move for my studies at NYU.  Here are some neighborhood options, with the closest subway transport options listed in parentheses when appropriate:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;B&gt;Brooklyn&lt;/B&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Fort Greene (B,R/DeKalb Av)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Flatbush (Lefferts Gardens:B,Q/Prospect Park)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Park Slope (Flatbush Av, F/7th Av)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Williamsburg (L/Bedford Av, Lorimer St)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Queens&lt;/B&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Long Island City&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Manhattan&lt;/B&gt;&lt;LI&gt;East Village&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Greenwich Village&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;NOHO&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;New Jersey&lt;/B&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Hoboken (Hoboken PATH)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Jersey City (Pavonia/Newport, Grove St. PATH)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/05/new-york-housing.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-5150756602734090169</guid><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2007 21:32:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2008-02-16T10:54:30.991-05:00</atom:updated><title>Tufts Ethics Comp Answers</title><description>The following is a study guide to the &lt;A HREF="http://ase.tufts.edu/philosophy/programs/comps/#ethics"&gt;Tufts Philosophy MA Ethics Comp&lt;/A&gt;.  Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily".  Sometimes, we have only resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Related pages include: &lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/07/tips-for-tufts-philosophy-ma-comps.html"&gt;General Tips&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-philosophy-of-science-comp.html"&gt;Philosophy of Science&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-metaphysics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Metaphysics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-epistemology-comp-answers.html"&gt;Epistemology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Ethics comp question, email me or post in the comments!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is Nietzsche's critique of morality? How compelling is it? Discuss with reference to at least one contemporary philosopher.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Brian Leiter, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/"&gt;Nietzsche's Moral and Political Philosophy&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Can moral rights or principles of justice be defended strictly on utilitarian grounds? How might the importance of rights and justice be weighed against the maximization of happiness overall?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/#ConWhaRigRelRul"&gt;Consequentialism&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Explain the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. Should agent-relative reasons play any role in moral reasoning? Discuss with respect to at least two philosophers.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Michael Ridge, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-agent/"&gt;Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;; Diane Jeske, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/"&gt;Special Obligations&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Virtue theorists claim that their theories give a more adequate account of our moral commitments than do theories based on principles. Evaluate this claim and explain what is at stake in the controversy between virtue theorists and proponents of theories based on moral principles.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Robert B. Louden, "Virtue Ethics", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., V.9) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 687-689; Rosalind Hursthouse, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/"&gt;Virtue Ethics&lt;/A&gt;"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;The position known in contemporary ethical theory as "situationism" constitutes a particular critique of virtue ethics. What is this critique? How might virtue ethicists respond to it? What could be the significance to moral philosophy of appeals to empirical findings of the sort presented by the situationist?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Marcia Homiak, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character/#ChaPosSit"&gt;Moral Character&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;; John Doris, Stephen Stich, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-psych-emp/#VirEthSkeAboCha"&gt;Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What role, if any, should blame and praise play in moral life and moral philosophy? Discuss with reference to at least two philosophers.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Andrew Eshleman, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/"&gt;Moral Responsibility&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;; Owen McLeod, "&lt;A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desert/"&gt;Desert&lt;/A&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What, if anything, is wrong with the idea that some people's desires are not in their own best interest and, thus, should not be taken into account in our moral deliberation? Discuss one moral theory that endorses paternalism and another that rejects it.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;Joel Feinberg, "Paternalism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., V.7) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 137-140; Gerald Dworkin, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/"&gt;Paternalism&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;; Richard Arneson, "&lt;A HREF="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L069"&gt;Paternalism&lt;/A&gt;", in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Describe the position known in contemporary ethical theory as "particularism." What do you take to be the best argument for it? What might be its main weaknesses?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Jonathan Dancy, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/"&gt;Moral Particularism&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Do ethical judgments have cognitive content? Discuss with reference to at least two philosophers.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Mark van Roojen, "&lt;A href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/"&gt;Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the source of moral normativity? Discuss with respect to at least two philosophers.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Stephen Darwall, "&lt;A href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L135"&gt;Normativity&lt;/a&gt;" in E. Craig (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;. (London: Routledge, 2001).&lt;!--&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;--&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-ethics-comp-answers.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-8693533499633248945</guid><pubDate>Sun, 06 May 2007 22:58:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2008-02-16T10:54:54.811-05:00</atom:updated><title>Tufts Epistemology Comp Answers</title><description>The following is a study guide to the &lt;A HREF="http://ase.tufts.edu/philosophy/programs/comps/#epistemology"&gt;Tufts Philosophy MA Epistemology Comp&lt;/A&gt;.  Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily".  Sometimes, we have only resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Related pages include: &lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/07/tips-for-tufts-philosophy-ma-comps.html"&gt;General Tips&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-philosophy-of-science-comp.html"&gt;Philosophy of Science&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-metaphysics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Metaphysics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-ethics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Ethics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Epistemology comp question, email me or post in the comments!&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Causal theories of knowledge are supposed to differentiate between those beliefs that are knowledge and those that are not.  Can such theories do so for mathematical knowledge?  Explore the ramifications of your answer.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Alvin Plantinga, &lt;I&gt;Warrant and Proper Function&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Oxford, 1993), p. 113-117; Marshall Swain, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P004"&gt;Knowledge, Causal Theory of&lt;/a&gt;". in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998); Albert Casullo, "A Priori Knowledge", in Paul K. Moser, &lt;I&gt;The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 130-131.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Much of what we normally call knowledge involves information that we believe only on the basis of what others have told us -- i.e. on the basis of testimony.  What conditions have to be met for us to gain knowledge from the testimony of others?  How does this putative way of gaining knowledge compare with other putative ways?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Robert Audi, Chapter 5 in &lt;i&gt;Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 2/e&lt;/i&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 2003); C.A.J. Coady, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P049"&gt;Testimony&lt;/a&gt;". in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998); Elizabeth Fricker, "Testimony", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., V.9) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 400-403; Jonathan Adler, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/"&gt;Epistemological Problems of Testimony&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Has anyone ever given good reasons for thinking that there are such things as sense-data?  If so, indicate what these reasons are and why they are good.  If not, indicate what is wrong with the sorts of reasons that have usually been given.&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;What is the best way to understand the notion of “sense-data”? Explain and evaluate what you take to be the best reasons for believing in such things.&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;"We know that it must be possible to define material things in terms of sense contents, because it is only by the occurrence of certain sense contents that the existence of any material thing can ever be in the least degree verified."  (Ayer, &lt;I&gt;Language, Truth and Logic&lt;/I&gt;)  Explain and criticize.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; R. J. Hirst, "Phenomenalism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., Vol.7). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 271-277; Michael Huemer, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/"&gt;Sense-Data&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Given Kuhn's and others' arguments for the incommensurability of scientific theories before and after major scientific developments, can empirical science nevertheless be said to yield knowledge?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Gerald Doppelt, "Scientific Revolutions", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., Vol.8). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006) p. 694-703.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the distinction between internalism and externalism as regards justification and as characterized by Chisholm and taken up by such figures as Bonjour, Goldman, Fumerton, and Sosa?  Is there any way of settling the dispute between internalists and externalists?  Is there any way of reconciling these two points of view?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; William P. Alston, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P028"&gt;Internalism and externalism in epistemology&lt;/a&gt;" in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the problem of other minds?  What do Kripke and/or Wittgenstein mean by suggesting that there is a problem of meaning, as well as a problem of knowledge, where the mental states of others are concerned?  Can we address the problem of knowledge without first addressing the problem of meaning?  Is there a plausible solution to the problem of knowledge?&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;The skeptic about other minds is someone who claims that we can never know what someone else is thinking or feeling. Present what you take to be the strongest argument for this claim, and then discuss it critically.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Alec Hyslop, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/"&gt;Other Minds&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;; Alec Hyslop, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V022"&gt;Other Minds&lt;/a&gt;", in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;One of the central questions in modern epistemology is whether there are any incorrigible beliefs.  Why has this question been so important?  Should it continue to be?  Explain your answer.&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;Does our knowledge of the external world rest on foundations?  If not, could the justification of our beliefs about the external world be merely a matter of their coherence with one another?  If so, are we justified in ruling out the possibility that they are merely a coherent dream?  Is there any alternative to coherentism and foundationalism?&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;What are the principal problems for coherentist accounts of justification?  For foundationalist accounts?  Is there any alternative?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Robert Audi, Chapter 7 in &lt;i&gt;Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 2/e&lt;/i&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 2003); Richard Fumerton, "Classical Foundationalism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., Vol.2). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006) p. 275-279; John W. Bender, "Coherentism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., Vol.2). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006) p. 313-315; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the thesis of contextualism in epistemology?  Is it true?  If so, what is the significance? Can it be used to defuse the threat of skepticism?&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;What is contextualism in epistemology?  If true, would it help to answer a radical form of skepticism like Hume’s about the external world?  Would it help to answer any other form of skepticism?  If not, what is its significance for epistemology?&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;Some philosophers think that “know” is a word which shifts in its standards according to the context in which it is used. Discuss this claim, and the possibility of using it as tool for undermining skeptical positions about knowledge.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Bruce W. Brower, &lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P058"&gt;Contextualism, epistemological&lt;/a&gt;. in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998); Ram Neta, "Contextualism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., V.2) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 482-488; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the Gettier problem? Is there a good way of solving it? Does it matter if there is or isn’t a solution?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Robert K. Shope. "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P022"&gt;Gettier problems&lt;/a&gt;. in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;We must depend on memory for much of our knowledge. But how do we know that memory is reliable?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Robert Audi, Chapter 2 in &lt;i&gt;Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 2/e&lt;/i&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 2003)&lt;!-- LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is meant by direct perception?  Is there any?  Would it have any significance for epistemology  if there were?&lt;/B&gt; and &lt;B&gt;Suppose that we understand the concept of direct perception by analogy with the concept of basic action.  An action is basic just in case when we perform it, there is no other action in virtue of which we do so.  Similarly a case of basic perception would be one in which we perceive something and we do not do so in virtue of perceiving anything else.  Are there cases direct perception in this sense?  If so, what kinds of things can we perceive directly?  What are the most interesting implications for epistemology of your answers?&lt;/b&gt; and &lt;B&gt;If the claim that we have direct perception of external objects is not the claim that our perceptual access to them is unmediated by any causal connections, what is it?  Of what significance is it?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What can be said in favor of a program of naturalized epistemology? To what extent can (or should) such a program do justice to the normative element in epistemology as it has been traditionally understood?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;If we were to treat epistemology from a scientific perspective, which science or sciences should we appeal to? Quine seems to think that the appeal should be to the cognitive and/or brain sciences, but what about the sociology of knowledge? Are there other possibilities? What, if anything, of epistemological significance hangs on the choice?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;If we were to treat epistemology from a scientific perspective, which science or sciences should we appeal to?  Quine seemed to think that the appeal should be to the cognitive and/or brain sciences, but what about the sociology of knowledge?  Are there other possibilities?  What, if anything, of epistemological significance hangs on the choice?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;When G.E. Moore tries to refute the sceptic by showing her his hands, has he missed the point?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Nearly all epistemologists accord a central role to observation. Even confirmation holists (such as Quine) take observation as crucial. Some time ago, Feyerabend, and more recently, Fodor, have argued that giving such an epistemic role to observation is misguided. “Observation,” is a psychological term, and not an epistemological one. “Evidence,” is an epistemological term, and “evidence” need not be composed of observations. What is the role of observation in knowledge acquisition and justification?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Many philosophers before recent times considered geometry as an exemplar of knowledge. Does geometry provide us with knowledge of necessary truths, or even truths about the world? If so, how? If not, why not?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Enthusiastic readings of Kuhn have encouraged some people to say that science is just another form of religious or political activity, and its so-called discoveries are no more objective than the declarations of (other) religious leaders. Is there a stable, moderate Kuhnian position that doesn’t lapse into either radical relativism on the one hand, or a relatively trivial claim (from the point of view of epistemology) about the finite and corrigible perspective of any particular group of knowers on the other?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Does science show that we never directly perceive objects?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Words, and what they mean, are human products, and consequently they are sometimes not made as well as they should be. Consider the word “know”; perhaps all that the skeptical scenarios, and other philosophical conundrums that have swirled around the topic of knowledge, show is that the word “know” has been designed badly, and that we should replace it with a better word. Discuss.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;In ordinary contexts we seem to credit ourselves with knowledge even when the possibility of error is not ruled out on logical or conceptual grounds.  If so, does certainty have any special place in epistemology?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Some philosophers argue that for all we know we could be brains in vats, or bodies in capsules, and that therefore we don’t know anything about “the external world.”  Could we be brains in vats or bodies in capsules?  Does it make sense to think we could be?  Why?  And suppose that we might be.  Would that undermine the validity of our knowledge claims about the world in the way that the skeptic takes it to?  Why or why not?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Usually, science is thought of as pursuing truth.  But philosophers of science as diverse in their viewpoints as Duhem and Kuhn contend that truth per se has no place in science; and even Putnam in his realist days called attention to the tendency of the most celebrated results of science later to turn out not to be true.  Does science pursue truth?  If not, what does it pursue?  Explain your answer.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Some recent philosophers, most notably John McDowell, have argued that what we—competent speakers—experience is, even that it must be, always already ‘conceptualized’. Others have argued that it needn’t be, and that in fact it isn’t conceptualized until we judge or otherwise make up our mind about it. What is the most plausible understanding of the idea that what we experience is conceptualized? What is the strongest reason for thinking that experience is conceptualized, or even that it must be?  What is the strongest reason for thinking that it isn’t conceptualized, or even that it couldn’t be?  What is your view?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Is skepticism about the external world natural, or do even the best arguments for such skepticism presuppose controversial theoretical commitments?  What are the implications of the answer as regards our prospects for countering the claims of the skeptic?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt; What is the difference between internal and external skepticism?  What are some examples of each?  Can we answer either the external skeptic or the internal skeptic?  If so, how?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What, according to Williams, is epistemological realism?  Should we deny it?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Are there any propositions about which we could not possibly be mistaken?  If there are, could they provide an infallible foundation for the rest of our beliefs?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;“Part of one’s epistemic duty is to reflect critically upon one’s beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing things to which one has, to one’s knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic access.” What is at stake in the view expressed here? Is the view correct? How would we explain our knowledge of mathematical objects on such a view?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Some traditions in epistemology would have us believe that skepticism, or the hypotheses which fuel it, are incoherent, senseless, self-refuting, or otherwise self-stultifying.  Which, if any, forms of skepticism about the external world suffer from such defects?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;“It does seem to me very certain that I know little, if anything, with certainty regarding the future.” (G.E. Moore, “Four Forms of Skepticism”)  Can we have any knowledge of the future?  If so, explain how.  If not, explain why not.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Is self knowledge a matter of inner perception?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Gertler, Brie, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/"&gt;Self-Knowledge&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Do Quinean and/or Davidsonian principles of charity of interpretation have any consequences for the epistemology of logic?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; Richard Feldman, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P006SECT4"&gt;Charity, principle of&lt;/a&gt;". in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (London: Routledge, 1998).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Discuss the traditional problem of induction, and Goodman’s “new riddle,” and their proposed solutions.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;“...no statement is immune to revision.  Revision even of the logical law of excluded middle has been proposed...What difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superceded Ptolemy...?”  Are the laws of logic revisable?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;“We know some things non-inferentially or directly or immediately because it is impossible that all our knowledge be based on inference.”  What support can be given for this claim?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;If some things are inconceivable, does this show that there are limits to the human intellect, or that some things are impossible?  Does it show anything at all?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Can a “causal theory” of knowledge make sense of mathematical knowledge?  If not, what gives?  If so, how?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; --&gt;&lt;!--&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;br /&gt;--&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-epistemology-comp-answers.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-5247876384609620891</guid><pubDate>Mon, 16 Apr 2007 02:20:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-04-16T09:01:20.381-04:00</atom:updated><title>Finetune</title><description>So, the folks at &lt;a href="http://www.finetune.com/"&gt;finetune.com&lt;/a&gt; have created a nifty little music service that, in my opinion, is superior to &lt;a href="http://www.pandora.com/"&gt;Pandora&lt;/a&gt;.  They let you create playlists that can be shared with others.  I spent some time putting one together: &lt;a onClick="javascript:window.open('http://www.angasm.org/bpics/finetune.html','finetune','height=220,width=215,titlebar=no,menubar=no,scrollbars=no,location=no,toolbar=no,status=no,resizeable=no')" href="javascript:doNothing();"&gt;Check it out&lt;/a&gt;.</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/04/finetune.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-7725290959933572862</guid><pubDate>Thu, 12 Apr 2007 12:35:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-04-15T23:20:48.888-04:00</atom:updated><title>Philosophy PhD programs</title><description>So, I've decided to attend NYU to study for the PhD in philosophy this fall.  It's a relief to have figured this out; I've been thinking about the choice non-stop since the first notification of admission came along in early February.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I applied to ten schools and nine offered admission with full funding (Princeton rejected me).  Below, I represent which offers were "in the running" as they appeared and were eliminated over the last 10 weeks or so.  The top choice(s) at each time are in boldface;  schools are removed as I decline the offers.&lt;P ALIGN="CENTER"&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/5&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Pitt HPS&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/13&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Pitt HPS&lt;/B&gt;, Irvine LPS&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/14&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Pitt HPS&lt;/B&gt;, Irvine LPS, UCLA&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/15&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Pitt HPS&lt;/B&gt;, Irvine LPS, UCLA, Notre Dame&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/17&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Pitt HPS&lt;/B&gt;, Irvine LPS, UCLA, Notre Dame, &lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/21&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pitt HPS, Irvine LPS, Notre Dame, &lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;2/28&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pitt HPS, Irvine LPS, Notre Dame, &lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;3/1&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Irvine LPS, &lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;Rutgers&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;3/2&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Irvine LPS, &lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;Rutgers&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;Michigan&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;3/6&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Irvine LPS, &lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;Rutgers&lt;/B&gt;, Michigan, &lt;B&gt;Harvard&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;3/17&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, Rutgers, Michigan, &lt;B&gt;Harvard&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;3/23&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Stanford&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, Rutgers, Michigan, Harvard&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;4/1&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Stanford, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;Rutgers&lt;/B&gt;, Michigan, Harvard&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;4/5&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Stanford, &lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, &lt;B&gt;Rutgers&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;4/6&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;, Rutgers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;I&gt;4/12&lt;/I&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;NYU&lt;/B&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/04/philosophy-phd-programs.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-6010880379863920143</guid><pubDate>Sat, 17 Feb 2007 13:46:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-03-10T09:49:37.350-05:00</atom:updated><title>Visiting grad programs</title><description>I'm going to start visiting philosophy PhD programs next week, and have been gathering advice on what to look for.  Here is a summary (this post will be subject to continuous revision):&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;B&gt;Talk to as many grad students as possible, to determine:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;the availability of various professors&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;the quality of mentoring&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;what each professor is like as an advisor&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;the collegiality vs. competitiveness of the environment&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;what's worst about the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;overall morale&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;whether grad students do much teaching, and how fun/distracting that is&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;the level of support given to students to help them pass "milestones" in the program (qualifying exams, papers, etc.)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;how long it usually takes to complete the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;what convinced &lt;i&gt;them&lt;/i&gt; to choose the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;what percentage of those who start the program complete it, and why those who drop out do so&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;what topics they are working on&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;If anything surprised them after they showed up at the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt; &lt;B&gt;Talk to the professors you might want to work with to get:&lt;/B&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;a general "read" on your potential compatibility&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;an idea of the level of support you might expect when you're looking for jobs&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;their view on what sorts of students wind up being the most successful in the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;their view on what sorts of projects wind up being the most successful dissertations&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;an understanding of why they think you are an attractive candidate for the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;what they most want to improve about the program&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;The &lt;a href="http://www.athenareport.org/"&gt;Athena Report&lt;/a&gt; provides a good example of the sorts of questions to ask of students.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Finally, although there is no real pressure to make any decisions until April 15, it is a good thing if you're able to turn down schools early, so students on waitlists have a chance.  This is particularly relevant the more offers you're sitting on, for at least two reasons: 1) with more offers, you are influencing more waitlists, 2) the more offers you have, the more likely that certain programs can be ruled out altogether from your consideration.</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/02/visiting-grad-programs.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-6650956241382158792</guid><pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2007 12:35:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-02-16T07:54:19.063-05:00</atom:updated><title>Einstein's Twins Paradox</title><description>Subhash Kak has recently published an extremely interesting resolution of the Twins Paradox [&lt;a href="http://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0605199"&gt;arXiv.org PDF&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/e4670q159464473r/?p=9724bdccded240a59c384dcdefcded98&amp;pi=1"&gt;SpringerLink&lt;/a&gt;], one which assumes spatial isotropy in the universe: "We propose that isotropy is a requirement for a frame to be inertial."</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/02/einsteins-twin-paradox.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-4192028188512180055</guid><pubDate>Sat, 13 Jan 2007 18:03:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2008-02-16T10:55:14.906-05:00</atom:updated><title>Tufts Philosophy of Science Comp Answers</title><description>The following is a study guide to the &lt;A HREF="http://ase.tufts.edu/philosophy/programs/comps/#science"&gt;Tufts Philosophy of Science Comp&lt;/A&gt;.  Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily".  Sometimes, we reference resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Related pages include: &lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/07/tips-for-tufts-philosophy-ma-comps.html"&gt;General Tips&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-metaphysics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Metaphysics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-epistemology-comp-answers.html"&gt;Epistemology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-ethics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Ethics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Philosophy of Science comp question, email me or post in the comments!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;The concept of normal science is part of a four-fold distinction Kuhn introduced: immature science, normal science, science in crisis, and scientific revolutions.  David Bloor has argued that, even though comparatively little attention is given to it in &lt;i&gt;The Structure of Scientific Revolutions&lt;/i&gt;, the concept of normal science is the most important idea put forward in the book.  By contrast, various followers of Popper have argued that there is no such thing as normal science -- or at least there ought not to be. Is there such a thing as normal science?  Of what importance, if any, is the distinction between normal science and extraordinary science to the philosophy of science?  Of what importance is it to historians of science?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;More In-Depth&lt;/i&gt;: John Worrall, "Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn 'versus' Popper and Lakatos", in Thomas Nickles (ed.), &lt;I&gt;Thomas Kuhn&lt;/I&gt;. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 65-100&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;"Reductionism" is a pejorative term often applied by self-styled "holists" and "anti-reductionists" to various schools of scientific thought; yet, the "reduction" of cellular biology to chemistry, or chemistry to physics, is at the same time held up as a triumph of modern science. Describe varieties of reductionism, and evaluate some of the main arguments for and against reductionism.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Jaegwon Kim, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Q089"&gt;Reduction, problems of.&lt;/a&gt;", in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;I&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;. (London: Routledge, 1998)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;One might say that colors have been explained, but ghosts have been explained away. Aristotle considered telos ("final cause") or purpose as one of the four fundamental aitia or causes.  Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is often said to provide a reduction of the apparent purpose in nature to purposeless mechanism.  Is this explanation like the explanation of color or ghosts?  Has Darwin shown that there is no purpose, or has he shown how to explain real purpose?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: For the distinction between "explaining" and "explaining away", see Lawrence Sklar, "&lt;a href="http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28196708%2918%3A2%3C109%3ATOIR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5"&gt;Types of Inter-theoretic Reduction&lt;/a&gt;", &lt;I&gt;Philosophy of Science&lt;/I&gt; 18 (1967), p. 112-113.  For the rest, see Andrew Woodfield, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N087"&gt;Teleology&lt;/a&gt;", in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;. (London: Routledge, 1998); Colin Allen, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/"&gt;Teleological Notions in Biology&lt;/a&gt;", Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;; and Elliott Sober, "Philosophy of Biology" in Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (eds.) &lt;i&gt;The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;, 2/e. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 319-320.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What does it mean to say that some term in science designates a quantity, what is required of any procedure for it to be a measure of such a quantity, and how can measurement provide evidence bearing on whether the quantity is something more than a mere artifact of our creation and the measure is accurate?  Illustrate your answer with temperature or time, or any other comparable quantity from whatever science you wish.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Zoltan Domotor, "Measurement and Measurement Theory" in Donald Borchert (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; (2nd ed., V.6) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 86-92.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;The best kinds of evidence for the reality of a postulated or inferred entity is that we can begin to measure it or otherwise understand its causal powers.  The best evidence, in turn, that we have this kind of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build machines that will work fairly reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus. Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientific realism about entities."  To what extent does this proposal of Ian Hacking's end the dispute between realism and instrumentalism?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Lyle Zynda's lectures on the Philosophy of Science, &lt;a href="http://www.soc.iastate.edu/Sapp/phil_sci_lecture19.html"&gt;#19&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.soc.iastate.edu/Sapp/phil_sci_lecture20.html"&gt;#20&lt;/a&gt;.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Atomic theory, quantum theory, Einstein's theory of general relativity, Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, the "big bang" theory, and elasticity theory are just a handful of the logical structures which are called "theories".  What exactly is a scientific theory?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Somewhat difficult to read&lt;/i&gt;: Frederick Suppe, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Q104"&gt;Theories, scientific&lt;/a&gt;". in E. Craig (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;. (London: Routledge, 1998).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Carl Hempel once remarked, "The establishment of a general theory of confirmation may well be regarded as one of the most urgent desiderata of the present methodology of empirical science.  Indeed, it seems that a precise analysis of the concept of confirmation is a necessary condition for an adequate solution of various fundamental problems concerning the logical structure of scientific procedure."  What is the task of a theory of confirmation, and why is it important?  Explain why the general approach that ought to be taken to this task is still very much a matter of dispute, in the process sketching at least two of the widely adopted general approaches and indicating how they fall short.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Theo Kuipers, "&lt;a href="http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Q015"&gt;Confirmation theory&lt;/a&gt;" in E. Craig (Ed.), &lt;i&gt;Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;. (London: Routledge, 1998). and Patrick Maher, "&lt;a href="http://patrick.maher1.net/ctk.pdf"&gt;Confirmation Theory&lt;/a&gt;" in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), &lt;i&gt;Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2/e&lt;/i&gt; Macmillan Reference USA 2006.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;!--&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;--&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-philosophy-of-science-comp.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-1529120933037088524</guid><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 14:45:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2008-02-16T10:55:28.619-05:00</atom:updated><title>Tufts Metaphysics Comp Answers</title><description>The following is a study guide to the &lt;A HREF="http://ase.tufts.edu/philosophy/programs/comps/#metaphysics"&gt;Tufts Philosophy MA Metaphysics Comp&lt;/A&gt;.  Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily".  Sometimes, we have only resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Related pages include: &lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/07/tips-for-tufts-philosophy-ma-comps.html"&gt;General Tips&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-philosophy-of-science-comp.html"&gt;Philosophy of Science&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-epistemology-comp-answers.html"&gt;Epistemology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://angasm.org/2007/05/tufts-ethics-comp-answers.html"&gt;Ethics&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Metaphysics comp question, email me or post in the comments!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Are there any good arguments for or against a four-dimensional ontology?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Michael J. Loux, &lt;I&gt;Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 6.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-depth&lt;/i&gt;: Michael Rea, "&lt;a href="http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/Online%20Papers/Four%20Dimensionalism.pdf"&gt;Four-Dimensionalism&lt;/a&gt;," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., &lt;I&gt;The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics&lt;/I&gt; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 246-280. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Why might someone deny that the past exists?  If it does not, how can we admire Socrates?  What makes it true that there were dinosaurs?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Michael J. Loux, &lt;I&gt;Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 6.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-depth&lt;/i&gt;: Thomas Crisp, "Presentism," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., &lt;I&gt;The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics&lt;/I&gt; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 211-245. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the point of invoking possible worlds when discussing modality?  What must possible worlds be like if it is to succeed?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Michael J. Loux, &lt;I&gt;Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 5.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-depth&lt;/i&gt;: Theodore Sider, "&lt;a href="http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/sider/papers/modality.pdf"&gt;Reductive Theories of Modality&lt;/a&gt;," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., &lt;I&gt;The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics&lt;/I&gt; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 180-208. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;If there are properties, what are they like?  Does this show that there aren’t any?  Is there any alterative to positing properties?&lt;/B&gt; and another question &lt;B&gt;Things are similar in various ways, and our thought and language is capable of generality.  What accounts for these facts?&lt;/B&gt; and another question &lt;B&gt;What is an abstract entity?  How do abstract entities differ from concrete ones?  Are there any abstract entities?&lt;/B&gt; and another question &lt;B&gt;Is the nominalist’s ontology of concrete particulars enough?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Michael J. Loux, &lt;I&gt;Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapters 1-2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-depth&lt;/i&gt;: Chris Swoyer, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/"&gt;Properties&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward Zalta, ed., &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the best version of the argument for the non-existence of God based on the problem of Evil?  Does it succeed?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Derk Pereboom, "&lt;a href="http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/pereboom/PEFin.pdf"&gt;The Problem of Evil&lt;/a&gt;," in William E. Mann, ed., &lt;i&gt;The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion&lt;/i&gt;,  Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 148-70&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;The death of correspondence theories of truth has been widely heralded.  What exactly is a correspondence theory of truth, and why would someone be tempted to hold such?  Why are such theories supposed to be untenable?  Are they?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Marian David, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/"&gt;The Correspondence Theory of Truth&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward Zalta, ed., &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Some contemporary philosophers are “fictionalists” about mathematical objects; others are fictionalists about possible worlds or literary characters.  What is fictionalism about a kind of object?  How does it differ from instrumentalism (about the sort)?  Evaluate reasons for and against fictionalism with respect to some particular sort of object?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt; &lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: I suggest just focusing on fictionalism about possible worlds, because this article is so comprehensive: Daniel Nolan, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-modal/"&gt;Modal Fictionalism&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What relation must my beliefs and desires have to my choices, and my choices to my actions, if my actions are to be reckoned to be free?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Timothy O'Connor, "&lt;a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/"&gt;Free Will&lt;/a&gt;", in Edward Zalta, ed., &lt;i&gt;The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Could two substances be perfect qualitative duplicates?  What does this show about substances?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Michael J. Loux, &lt;I&gt;Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction&lt;/I&gt;. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 3.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Can conceptual analysis help us discover metaphysical truths?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-Depth&lt;/i&gt;: Frank Jackson, "Armchair Metaphysics", Philosophy in Mind, ed. John O'Leary Hawthorne and Michaelis Michael, &lt;I&gt;Philosophical Studies Series&lt;/I&gt;, vol. 60, Kluwer, 1994, pp. 23-42.  Reprinted in Mark Richard, ed., &lt;i&gt;Meaning&lt;/i&gt; (New York: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 317-337.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Are all ontological disputes ultimately merely verbal?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-Depth&lt;/i&gt;: Theodore Sider, "&lt;a href="http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/sider/papers/ontological_realism.pdf"&gt;Ontological Realism&lt;/a&gt;", forthcoming in David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman (eds), &lt;i&gt;Metametaphysics&lt;/i&gt; (Oxford University Press, 2007)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;To what extent should a metaphysical theory respect our pre-theoretic intuitions?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-Depth&lt;/i&gt;: Timothy Williamson, &lt;a href="http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/faculty/members/docs/intuit3.pdf"&gt;Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Do macroscopic objects cause anything?  If so, is there pervasive causal overdetermination?  Does it matter if there is?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;: Theodore Sider, &lt;a href="http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/sider/papers/overdetermination.pdf"&gt;What's So Bad about Overdetermination?&lt;/a&gt;", &lt;i&gt;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research&lt;/i&gt; 67 (2003):&amp;nbsp; 719-726&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;What is the relation between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;In-depth&lt;/i&gt;: Kit Fine, &lt;A HREF="http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1160/nonidentity.pdf"&gt;"The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter"&lt;/A&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;!--&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;Some people have rejected the notion of &lt;i&gt;de re&lt;/i&gt; modality.  Why?  How, if at all, can we make sense of it?&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;LI&gt;&lt;B&gt;&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;i&gt;Quick and easy&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;--&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/01/tufts-metaphysics-comp-answers.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-3252606353823624960</guid><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jan 2007 00:28:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-01-08T19:29:20.589-05:00</atom:updated><title>Ferrofluids are pretty weird</title><description>&lt;object height="350" width="425"&gt;&lt;param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/XliOko5xrr0"&gt;&lt;param name="wmode" value="transparent"&gt;&lt;embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/XliOko5xrr0" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" height="350" width="425"&gt;&lt;/embed&gt;&lt;/object&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/01/ferrofluids-are-pretty-weird.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-3790154305408079981</guid><pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2007 19:34:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2007-01-08T15:10:14.676-05:00</atom:updated><title>Comps and psychology</title><description>I finished my second try at the &lt;A href="http://ase.tufts.edu/philosophy/programs/comps/#metaphysics"&gt;metaphysics comp&lt;/A&gt; this afternoon, in my attempt to actually graduate before leaving after this semester.  I must admit, my psychology about this is pretty weird.  Actually &lt;i&gt;studying for and taking&lt;/i&gt; the test puts me into somewhat of a "manic" mode.  After having finished, I feel &lt;i&gt;energized&lt;/i&gt; and a bit excited to get started studying for the next comp (which I am taking Friday).  I would expect to want to take a break, but no, I want to read more philosophy.  I guess this means I should schedule more comps back-to-back like this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This manic episode contrasts with the depressive mode that I get into after learning that I failed a comp---and from seeing that the answer I thought was so complete when studying only barely passed with a "B-".  It seems that, at least with respect to these comps, I'm unable to judge the quality of my own work correctly.  I'm not sure why this is: it seems that with papers, for instance, I'm a more reliable judge of the quality of my own work.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These observations remind me of &lt;a href="http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000CB565-F330-11BE-AD0683414B7F0000"&gt;this article&lt;/a&gt;, which summarizes recent work that debunks the "self-esteem myth", the false but widely held belief that "a favorable opinion of oneself [is] the central psychological source from which all manner of positive outcomes spring". And then, there are the studies that we all tend to overrate ourselves &lt;a href="http://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/astrology/astrology.pdf"&gt;[PDF]&lt;/a&gt;, and that &lt;a href="http://www.apa.org/monitor/feb03/overestimate.html"&gt;the least competent tend to overrate themselves the most&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I suppose there is reason to interpret my psychological tendencies here as evidence of immaturity (both as a practitioner of philosophy and more generally as a human).  But no matter what, I suppose I should take advantage of this manic episode and get cracking on the next test...</description><link>http://angasm.org/2007/01/comps-and-psychology.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-116292422344585593</guid><pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2006 18:28:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2006-11-07T13:30:23.456-05:00</atom:updated><title>World's hardest sudoku</title><description>A &lt;a href="http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/other_news/&amp;articleid=289092"&gt;Finnish mathematician&lt;/a&gt; has reportedly spent three months creating the world's hardest Sudoku puzzle.  What do you think?&lt;p align=center&gt;&lt;img src="/bpics/sudoku.jpg"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description><link>http://angasm.org/2006/11/worlds-hardest-sudoku.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-116213852576795051</guid><pubDate>Sun, 29 Oct 2006 15:37:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2006-11-13T19:14:06.896-05:00</atom:updated><title>Perception</title><description>I finally finished the paper on perception for the class from last fall.  I investigate the "ordinary concept of perception"---what it is that we ordinarily mean when we say someone perceives (e.g., see, hears, touches, smells, etc.) something.  A standard way of investigating our ordinary concepts is to imagine various scenarios involving the concept and extracting how we, intuitively, think about the scenarios.  Here are the key "thought experiments" which I use to make my arguments:&lt;H3&gt;1. The neurosurgeon&lt;/H3&gt;  Joe is blind, due to a recent eye injury. Sue is a neurosurgeon who can give patients visual experiences by directly stimulating their brain. Sue mounts video cameras on Joe and links them to a probe which stimulates Joe's brain. Joe turns toward, say, a clock on the shelf.  The video cameras, which pick up the clock, send images to the probe, giving Joe a matching visual experience.  Does Joe see the clock on the shelf? &lt;H3&gt;2. The kaleidoscope&lt;/H3&gt;  A bug scrambles the visual experience which Joe receives. Instead of a visual experience of a clock, Joe gets the sort of colorful image you see when you look into a kaleidoscope. Since this pattern is derived from the video signal, it changes as Joe turns toward different objects. The changes, however, look to Joe as if a kaleidoscope is being rotated.  Does Joe see the clock on the shelf?  &lt;H3&gt;3. The holodeck&lt;/H3&gt; Sue takes Joe into an empty room and jacks his brain (wirelessly) into her computer.  This computer feeds Joe a fully interactive, digitally-generated visual experience.  The hallucination is completely convincing to Joe: he doesn't know it's made without the help of video cameras.  The hallucination is of a clock on a shelf. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The room, however, is a "holodeck," a &lt;i&gt;Star Trek&lt;/i&gt; inspired virtual environment in which "holographic" items may be materialized.  Somebody happens to hook up Sue's computer so the holodeck acquires a description of Joe's hallucination. The holodeck proceeds to materialize, at the apparent location, a "clock on shelf" which matches Joe's hallucination.  Sue is next to Joe in the holodeck; she can see this "clock on shelf" with her own eyes. Does Joe see the clock that Sue sees?  &lt;H3&gt;4. The holodeck, part II&lt;/H3&gt;Joe turns toward Sue. The computer, still stimulating Joe's brain, supplies Joe with a visual experience that matches Sue. The computer does this using an array of video cameras, which capture Sue's image and adjusts it to account for Joe's position and the perspective he should have of Sue. Does Joe see Sue?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Here are what I take to be our ordinary intuitive reactions to these cases.  In &lt;b&gt;1. The neurosurgeon&lt;/b&gt;, the special glasses enable Joe to see.  In &lt;b&gt;2. The kaleidoscope&lt;/b&gt;, the scrambling of the video signal is so severe that Joe no longer sees.  In &lt;b&gt;3. The holodeck&lt;/b&gt;, Joe does not see the same clock that Sue sees.  In &lt;b&gt;4. The holodeck, part II&lt;/b&gt;, Joe sees Sue. His visual experience is being created in the same manner as Joe's visual experience in case 1.</description><link>http://angasm.org/2006/10/perception.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-116187498517977073</guid><pubDate>Thu, 26 Oct 2006 14:20:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2006-10-26T20:26:50.806-04:00</atom:updated><title>Changing the Hard Drive in a Panasonic CF-R3</title><description>The laptop I use is a &lt;a href="http://panasonic.jp/pc/support/products/r3e/"&gt;Panasonic Let's Note CF-R3E&lt;/a&gt; which I got in Hong Kong in December of 2004.  Last winter, I slipped on some ice and fell on my back: crushing my backpack and the R3.  Thankfully, only a bit of plastic got broken, and I thought all was well.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As it turns out, the corner of the laptop which I fell on was also where the hard disk is at.  And a few weeks ago, I began to notice some intermittent hard drive flakiness.  It looked to me like I would need to change it out soon.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The stock disk in the CF-R3E is a 3.3V Toshiba MK4025GASL, a 40GB 2.5" 4200RPM drive.  &lt;a href="http://www.mfraenz.de/cf_y2/"&gt;This site&lt;/a&gt; claims that it can be replaced by a 5.0V Toshiba MK1031GAS, which is a 100GB 4200RPM drive that costs $85 from &lt;a href="http://www.ewiz.com/detail.php?name=DMTO1031S"&gt;ewiz.com&lt;/a&gt;.  Apparently, you can convert a 5.0V drive to a 3.3V drive by clipping pins 41 and 44.  Since my stock drive was clearly on its way out, I decided to go ahead and give it a try. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Fortunately, there are &lt;a href="http://homepage1.nifty.com/%7Egoemon/pc/pana/lets_note2.htm#r3_hdd"&gt;instructions online&lt;/a&gt; for disassembling a CF-R3E.  Unfortunately, it's all in Japanese.  I had to infer what to do from the pictures, and I spent the morning installing the drive.  Thankfully, it went well.  Here is an account of what I did.&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;Back up my hard disk.  I did this by booting with &lt;a href="http://www.nu2.nu/bootdisk/network/"&gt;Bart's Network Boot Disk&lt;/a&gt; (you'll need the rtsnd.cab package, to drive the R3's Realtek RTL8139/810X Family PCI Fast Ethernet controller), mounting a large drive on another computer through the network, and using Norton Ghost to back up the drive.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Disassemble the computer.  The Japanese site's pictures come in handy.  The first step is to remove the battery, revealing  two metal brackets---one on the left and one on the right---which keep the keyboard affixed:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img src="/cf-r3/r3_1.jpg"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Just slide each bracket upwards to take it off.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The second task is to remove two sets of screws from the back of the computer:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img src="/cf-r3/r3_2.jpg"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Each set is a different kind of screw: so there are two "cyan" style screws and six "yellow" style screws.  Make sure you remember which is which (though that's easy since there are only two of one and six of the other.)  The cyan screws go down all the way to the keyboard: make sure you're gentle with these. Don't press down too hard as you remove them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The third task is to remove two screws from the front, one underneath each hinge:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img src="/cf-r3/r3_3.jpg"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You'll have to peel off the rubber covers to get to these screws.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The fourth task is to detach the keyboard from the case.  You can get the keyboard up off the case by pushing on the tabs in the back, where the brackets were grabbing the keyboard.  Then you can grab the keyboard by the corners behind the ESC and DEL key.  Slowly angle the top of the keyboard towards you. There's a bit of adhesive behind the P-key that keeps the keyboard down.  Take care not to stress the keyboard too much, and make sure you watch out for the ribbon cable that attaches the keyboard (near the space bar) to the motherboard.  You'll have to unplug this cable. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You'll then find a metal heat spreader: just pull that up off the system.  You'll find some thermal grease connecting it to two chips.  You'll have to replace this grease later, when you reattach things.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now on to the fifth task: removing seven more screws!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img src="/cf-r3/r3_4.jpg"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At this point you can remove the front cover from the system.  A couple of notes on this: 1) be careful since there's another ribbon cable connecting the touch pad to the motherboard.  2) the cover to the ethernet and phone jacks can get snagged on the front case.  Make sure you keep that cover open.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Now we can replace the hard drive.  It's in the lower right of the computer:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img src="/cf-r3/r3_5.jpg"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Lift up the drive, taking care not to stress the ribbon cable connecting the drive to the laptop.  You can pry the cable off the hard drive without having to detach the cable from the motherboard.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img src="/cf-r3/r3_6.jpg"&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Look at the 40GB 3.3V hard drive.  Compare that drive with the 100GB.  You'll notice that the 40GB drive is missing a pin.  You'll have to get rid of that pin, and another one, on the 100GB drive.  I was able to bend them away, and plug it in.  Here's a diagram indicating which pins need to be modified:    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;pre&gt;◆◆ 　◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◇◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◇&lt;br /&gt;◆◆ 　◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◇◆&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Reverse the procedure in step 2 and you will have reassembled your laptop!&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Finally, boot up using Bart's network boot disk and use Norton Ghost to restore the backup you made in step 1.  Start it up and Windows XP should boot.  To use the new space, run disk administrator and create a new partition with the extra 60GB.  Alternatively, you can use Partition Magic to resize your existing partition.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;All done!  You now have a 1kg (2.2 lbs) notebook with 100GB of hard disk space!  You can also install a &lt;a href="http://www.memoryx.net/panxdu1024.html"&gt;1GB PC2700 MicroDIMM&lt;/a&gt; to bump the total RAM to 1.25GB (this is 512MB more than the R3 is officially supposed to go to).  Though the processor (a 1.1GHz Pentium M-733 with 2MB L2 cache and 400MHz FSB) limits performance significantly, the system is still quite functional.  The extra ram cuts the battery life from the rated 9hrs to around 6hrs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By comparison: the current model, just released a week ago by Panasonic, is the &lt;a href="http://panasonic.biz/pc/prod/note/r5l/"&gt;Let's Note CF-R5L&lt;/a&gt;, which features 512MB RAM (expandable to 1.5GB), a 60GB 4200RPM HD, a 1.2GHz Core Solo U1400 (2MB L2 cache, 533MHz FSB), and an 11-hr rated battery life.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So... Anyone want to buy a used Toshiba MK4025GASL drive?  :)</description><link>http://angasm.org/2006/10/changing-hard-drive-in-panasonic-cf-r3.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-116105731870235513</guid><pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2006 03:22:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2006-10-17T09:09:21.286-04:00</atom:updated><title>Financial Planning</title><description>I've been coming across quite a few articles celebrating a financial plan crafted by Dilbert cartoonist Scott Adams.  Called the "Unified Theory of Everything Financial", here is Adams's nine-point plan:&lt;OL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Make a will&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Pay off your credit cards&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Get term life insurance if you have a family to support&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Fund your 401k to the maximum&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Fund your IRA to the maximum&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Buy a house if you want to live in a house and can afford it&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Put six months worth of expenses in a money-market account&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Take whatever money is left over and invest 70% in a stock index fund and 30% in a bond fund through any discount broker and never touch it until retirement&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;If any of this confuses you, or you have something special going on (retirement, college planning, tax issues), hire a fee-based financial planner, not one who charges a percentage of your portfolio&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/OL&gt;This does seem to be pretty comprehensive to me.  I would add disability insurance to the list, and perhaps health insurance belongs there as well.   Six months of expenses in cash seems a bit high to me.  But I suppose with folks like E-Loan paying a phenomenal 5.5% APY, we can go higher on the cash.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Saying this deserves the Nobel Prize in economics is certainly creative exaggeration.  But it's useful advice, for sure.</description><link>http://angasm.org/2006/10/financial-planning.html</link><author>Ang</author></item><item><guid isPermaLink='false'>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-10866221.post-115988997054923622</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2006 15:28:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2006-10-03T11:48:05.500-04:00</atom:updated><title>EAC results</title><description>Previously, I had estimated 360 hours to rip 1000 CDs.  This was based on a 4x rip speed using EAC on a HP dvd200i DVD writer.  As it turns out, the drive was the problem.  I had an old JLMS (Lite-On) XJ-HD166S drive lying around.  It was able to rip at 12x with full error correction, and I recently finished all the CDs.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Unfortunately, I found a weird problem with using EAC on two drives.  When ripping simultaneously, &lt;i&gt;both&lt;/i&gt; drives slowed down to under 4x ripping speed.  So it was 50% faster to rip using just the Lite-On drive than using both the Lite-On and the HP.  I have no idea how to explain this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Here are the stats:&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Days to rip: 24&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;CDs: 1009&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;Bytes: 351982256 (FLAC Compressed)&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;So it all comes out to 336GB.  Seems the best way to back this up is with a spare hard drive.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This, by the way, represents the threshold at which I will purchase a portable music player---when I can fit my entire music collection in a lossless format.  Apple's ipod is at 80GB.  I suppose it will be about another 3-5 years before it or a competitor gets to ~400GB.</description><link>http://angasm.org/2006/10/eac-results.html</link><author>Ang</author></item></channel></rss>