The following is a study guide to the
Tufts Philosophy MA Epistemology Comp. Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily". Sometimes, we have only resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.
Related pages include:
General Tips Philosophy of Science Metaphysics EthicsIf you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Epistemology comp question, email me or post in the comments!
- Causal theories of knowledge are supposed to differentiate between those beliefs that are knowledge and those that are not. Can such theories do so for mathematical knowledge? Explore the ramifications of your answer.
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. (New York: Oxford, 1993), p. 113-117; Marshall Swain, "Knowledge, Causal Theory of". in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998); Albert Casullo, "A Priori Knowledge", in Paul K. Moser, The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 130-131.
- Much of what we normally call knowledge involves information that we believe only on the basis of what others have told us -- i.e. on the basis of testimony. What conditions have to be met for us to gain knowledge from the testimony of others? How does this putative way of gaining knowledge compare with other putative ways?
Robert Audi, Chapter 5 in Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 2/e. (New York: Routledge, 2003); C.A.J. Coady, "Testimony". in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998); Elizabeth Fricker, "Testimony", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., V.9) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 400-403; Jonathan Adler, "Epistemological Problems of Testimony", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy;
- Has anyone ever given good reasons for thinking that there are such things as sense-data? If so, indicate what these reasons are and why they are good. If not, indicate what is wrong with the sorts of reasons that have usually been given. and What is the best way to understand the notion of “sense-data”? Explain and evaluate what you take to be the best reasons for believing in such things. and "We know that it must be possible to define material things in terms of sense contents, because it is only by the occurrence of certain sense contents that the existence of any material thing can ever be in the least degree verified." (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic) Explain and criticize.
R. J. Hirst, "Phenomenalism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., Vol.7). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 271-277; Michael Huemer, "Sense-Data", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Given Kuhn's and others' arguments for the incommensurability of scientific theories before and after major scientific developments, can empirical science nevertheless be said to yield knowledge?
Gerald Doppelt, "Scientific Revolutions", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., Vol.8). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006) p. 694-703.
- What is the distinction between internalism and externalism as regards justification and as characterized by Chisholm and taken up by such figures as Bonjour, Goldman, Fumerton, and Sosa? Is there any way of settling the dispute between internalists and externalists? Is there any way of reconciling these two points of view?
William P. Alston, "Internalism and externalism in epistemology" in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998)
- What is the problem of other minds? What do Kripke and/or Wittgenstein mean by suggesting that there is a problem of meaning, as well as a problem of knowledge, where the mental states of others are concerned? Can we address the problem of knowledge without first addressing the problem of meaning? Is there a plausible solution to the problem of knowledge? and The skeptic about other minds is someone who claims that we can never know what someone else is thinking or feeling. Present what you take to be the strongest argument for this claim, and then discuss it critically.
Alec Hyslop, "Other Minds", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Alec Hyslop, "Other Minds", in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).
- One of the central questions in modern epistemology is whether there are any incorrigible beliefs. Why has this question been so important? Should it continue to be? Explain your answer. and Does our knowledge of the external world rest on foundations? If not, could the justification of our beliefs about the external world be merely a matter of their coherence with one another? If so, are we justified in ruling out the possibility that they are merely a coherent dream? Is there any alternative to coherentism and foundationalism? and What are the principal problems for coherentist accounts of justification? For foundationalist accounts? Is there any alternative?
Robert Audi, Chapter 7 in Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 2/e. (New York: Routledge, 2003); Richard Fumerton, "Classical Foundationalism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., Vol.2). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006) p. 275-279; John W. Bender, "Coherentism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., Vol.2). (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006) p. 313-315;
- What is the thesis of contextualism in epistemology? Is it true? If so, what is the significance? Can it be used to defuse the threat of skepticism? and What is contextualism in epistemology? If true, would it help to answer a radical form of skepticism like Hume’s about the external world? Would it help to answer any other form of skepticism? If not, what is its significance for epistemology? and Some philosophers think that “know” is a word which shifts in its standards according to the context in which it is used. Discuss this claim, and the possibility of using it as tool for undermining skeptical positions about knowledge.
Bruce W. Brower, Contextualism, epistemological. in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998); Ram Neta, "Contextualism", in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., V.2) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 482-488;
- What is the Gettier problem? Is there a good way of solving it? Does it matter if there is or isn’t a solution?
Robert K. Shope. "Gettier problems. in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).
- We must depend on memory for much of our knowledge. But how do we know that memory is reliable?
Robert Audi, Chapter 2 in Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 2/e. (New York: Routledge, 2003)
