Tufts Philosophy of Science Comp Answers

The following is a study guide to the Tufts Philosophy of Science Comp. Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily". Sometimes, we reference resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.

Related pages include:
      General Tips
      Metaphysics
      Epistemology
      Ethics

If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Philosophy of Science comp question, email me or post in the comments!

• The concept of normal science is part of a four-fold distinction Kuhn introduced: immature science, normal science, science in crisis, and scientific revolutions. David Bloor has argued that, even though comparatively little attention is given to it in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the concept of normal science is the most important idea put forward in the book. By contrast, various followers of Popper have argued that there is no such thing as normal science -- or at least there ought not to be. Is there such a thing as normal science? Of what importance, if any, is the distinction between normal science and extraordinary science to the philosophy of science? Of what importance is it to historians of science?
More In-Depth: John Worrall, "Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn 'versus' Popper and Lakatos", in Thomas Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 65-100


• "Reductionism" is a pejorative term often applied by self-styled "holists" and "anti-reductionists" to various schools of scientific thought; yet, the "reduction" of cellular biology to chemistry, or chemistry to physics, is at the same time held up as a triumph of modern science. Describe varieties of reductionism, and evaluate some of the main arguments for and against reductionism.
Quick and easy: Jaegwon Kim, "Reduction, problems of.", in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998)


• One might say that colors have been explained, but ghosts have been explained away. Aristotle considered telos ("final cause") or purpose as one of the four fundamental aitia or causes. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is often said to provide a reduction of the apparent purpose in nature to purposeless mechanism. Is this explanation like the explanation of color or ghosts? Has Darwin shown that there is no purpose, or has he shown how to explain real purpose?
Quick and easy: For the distinction between "explaining" and "explaining away", see Lawrence Sklar, "Types of Inter-theoretic Reduction", Philosophy of Science 18 (1967), p. 112-113. For the rest, see Andrew Woodfield, "Teleology", in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998); Colin Allen, "Teleological Notions in Biology", Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; and Elliott Sober, "Philosophy of Biology" in Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, 2/e. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 319-320.


• What does it mean to say that some term in science designates a quantity, what is required of any procedure for it to be a measure of such a quantity, and how can measurement provide evidence bearing on whether the quantity is something more than a mere artifact of our creation and the measure is accurate? Illustrate your answer with temperature or time, or any other comparable quantity from whatever science you wish.
Quick and easy: Zoltan Domotor, "Measurement and Measurement Theory" in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., V.6) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 86-92.


• The best kinds of evidence for the reality of a postulated or inferred entity is that we can begin to measure it or otherwise understand its causal powers. The best evidence, in turn, that we have this kind of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build machines that will work fairly reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus. Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientific realism about entities." To what extent does this proposal of Ian Hacking's end the dispute between realism and instrumentalism?
Quick and easy: Lyle Zynda's lectures on the Philosophy of Science, #19 and #20.


• Atomic theory, quantum theory, Einstein's theory of general relativity, Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, the "big bang" theory, and elasticity theory are just a handful of the logical structures which are called "theories". What exactly is a scientific theory?
Somewhat difficult to read: Frederick Suppe, "Theories, scientific". in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998).


• Carl Hempel once remarked, "The establishment of a general theory of confirmation may well be regarded as one of the most urgent desiderata of the present methodology of empirical science. Indeed, it seems that a precise analysis of the concept of confirmation is a necessary condition for an adequate solution of various fundamental problems concerning the logical structure of scientific procedure." What is the task of a theory of confirmation, and why is it important? Explain why the general approach that ought to be taken to this task is still very much a matter of dispute, in the process sketching at least two of the widely adopted general approaches and indicating how they fall short.
Quick and easy: Theo Kuipers, "Confirmation theory" in E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998). and Patrick Maher, "Confirmation Theory" in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2/e Macmillan Reference USA 2006.

Tufts Metaphysics Comp Answers

The following is a study guide to the Tufts Philosophy MA Metaphysics Comp. Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily". Sometimes, we have only resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.

Related pages include:
      General Tips
      Philosophy of Science
      Epistemology
      Ethics

If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Metaphysics comp question, email me or post in the comments!

• Are there any good arguments for or against a four-dimensional ontology?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 6.
In-depth: Michael Rea, "Four-Dimensionalism," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 246-280.


• Why might someone deny that the past exists? If it does not, how can we admire Socrates? What makes it true that there were dinosaurs?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 6.
In-depth: Thomas Crisp, "Presentism," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 211-245.


• What is the point of invoking possible worlds when discussing modality? What must possible worlds be like if it is to succeed?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 5.
In-depth: Theodore Sider, "Reductive Theories of Modality," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 180-208.


• If there are properties, what are they like? Does this show that there aren’t any? Is there any alterative to positing properties? and another question Things are similar in various ways, and our thought and language is capable of generality. What accounts for these facts? and another question What is an abstract entity? How do abstract entities differ from concrete ones? Are there any abstract entities? and another question Is the nominalist’s ontology of concrete particulars enough?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapters 1-2.
In-depth: Chris Swoyer, "Properties", in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• What is the best version of the argument for the non-existence of God based on the problem of Evil? Does it succeed?
Quick and easy: Derk Pereboom, "The Problem of Evil," in William E. Mann, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 148-70


• The death of correspondence theories of truth has been widely heralded. What exactly is a correspondence theory of truth, and why would someone be tempted to hold such? Why are such theories supposed to be untenable? Are they?
Quick and easy: Marian David, "The Correspondence Theory of Truth", in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• Some contemporary philosophers are “fictionalists” about mathematical objects; others are fictionalists about possible worlds or literary characters. What is fictionalism about a kind of object? How does it differ from instrumentalism (about the sort)? Evaluate reasons for and against fictionalism with respect to some particular sort of object?
Quick and easy: I suggest just focusing on fictionalism about possible worlds, because this article is so comprehensive: Daniel Nolan, "Modal Fictionalism", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• What relation must my beliefs and desires have to my choices, and my choices to my actions, if my actions are to be reckoned to be free?
Quick and easy: Timothy O'Connor, "Free Will", in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• Could two substances be perfect qualitative duplicates? What does this show about substances?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 3.


• Can conceptual analysis help us discover metaphysical truths?
In-Depth: Frank Jackson, "Armchair Metaphysics", Philosophy in Mind, ed. John O'Leary Hawthorne and Michaelis Michael, Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 60, Kluwer, 1994, pp. 23-42. Reprinted in Mark Richard, ed., Meaning (New York: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 317-337.


• Are all ontological disputes ultimately merely verbal?
In-Depth: Theodore Sider, "Ontological Realism", forthcoming in David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman (eds), Metametaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2007)


• To what extent should a metaphysical theory respect our pre-theoretic intuitions?
  
In-Depth: Timothy Williamson, Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement


• Do macroscopic objects cause anything? If so, is there pervasive causal overdetermination? Does it matter if there is?
Quick and easy: Theodore Sider, What's So Bad about Overdetermination?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003):  719-726


• What is the relation between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made?
In-depth: Kit Fine, "The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter"

Ferrofluids are pretty weird

Comps and psychology

I finished my second try at the metaphysics comp this afternoon, in my attempt to actually graduate before leaving after this semester. I must admit, my psychology about this is pretty weird. Actually studying for and taking the test puts me into somewhat of a "manic" mode. After having finished, I feel energized and a bit excited to get started studying for the next comp (which I am taking Friday). I would expect to want to take a break, but no, I want to read more philosophy. I guess this means I should schedule more comps back-to-back like this.

This manic episode contrasts with the depressive mode that I get into after learning that I failed a comp---and from seeing that the answer I thought was so complete when studying only barely passed with a "B-". It seems that, at least with respect to these comps, I'm unable to judge the quality of my own work correctly. I'm not sure why this is: it seems that with papers, for instance, I'm a more reliable judge of the quality of my own work.

These observations remind me of this article, which summarizes recent work that debunks the "self-esteem myth", the false but widely held belief that "a favorable opinion of oneself [is] the central psychological source from which all manner of positive outcomes spring". And then, there are the studies that we all tend to overrate ourselves [PDF], and that the least competent tend to overrate themselves the most.

I suppose there is reason to interpret my psychological tendencies here as evidence of immaturity (both as a practitioner of philosophy and more generally as a human). But no matter what, I suppose I should take advantage of this manic episode and get cracking on the next test...