Tufts Philosophy of Science Comp Answers

The following is a study guide to the Tufts Philosophy of Science Comp. Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily". Sometimes, we reference resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.

Related pages include:
      General Tips
      Metaphysics
      Epistemology
      Ethics

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• The concept of normal science is part of a four-fold distinction Kuhn introduced: immature science, normal science, science in crisis, and scientific revolutions. David Bloor has argued that, even though comparatively little attention is given to it in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the concept of normal science is the most important idea put forward in the book. By contrast, various followers of Popper have argued that there is no such thing as normal science -- or at least there ought not to be. Is there such a thing as normal science? Of what importance, if any, is the distinction between normal science and extraordinary science to the philosophy of science? Of what importance is it to historians of science?
More In-Depth: John Worrall, "Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn 'versus' Popper and Lakatos", in Thomas Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 65-100


• "Reductionism" is a pejorative term often applied by self-styled "holists" and "anti-reductionists" to various schools of scientific thought; yet, the "reduction" of cellular biology to chemistry, or chemistry to physics, is at the same time held up as a triumph of modern science. Describe varieties of reductionism, and evaluate some of the main arguments for and against reductionism.
Quick and easy: Jaegwon Kim, "Reduction, problems of.", in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998)


• One might say that colors have been explained, but ghosts have been explained away. Aristotle considered telos ("final cause") or purpose as one of the four fundamental aitia or causes. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is often said to provide a reduction of the apparent purpose in nature to purposeless mechanism. Is this explanation like the explanation of color or ghosts? Has Darwin shown that there is no purpose, or has he shown how to explain real purpose?
Quick and easy: For the distinction between "explaining" and "explaining away", see Lawrence Sklar, "Types of Inter-theoretic Reduction", Philosophy of Science 18 (1967), p. 112-113. For the rest, see Andrew Woodfield, "Teleology", in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998); Colin Allen, "Teleological Notions in Biology", Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; and Elliott Sober, "Philosophy of Biology" in Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, 2/e. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 319-320.


• What does it mean to say that some term in science designates a quantity, what is required of any procedure for it to be a measure of such a quantity, and how can measurement provide evidence bearing on whether the quantity is something more than a mere artifact of our creation and the measure is accurate? Illustrate your answer with temperature or time, or any other comparable quantity from whatever science you wish.
Quick and easy: Zoltan Domotor, "Measurement and Measurement Theory" in Donald Borchert (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed., V.6) (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), p. 86-92.


• The best kinds of evidence for the reality of a postulated or inferred entity is that we can begin to measure it or otherwise understand its causal powers. The best evidence, in turn, that we have this kind of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build machines that will work fairly reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus. Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientific realism about entities." To what extent does this proposal of Ian Hacking's end the dispute between realism and instrumentalism?
Quick and easy: Lyle Zynda's lectures on the Philosophy of Science, #19 and #20.


• Atomic theory, quantum theory, Einstein's theory of general relativity, Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, the "big bang" theory, and elasticity theory are just a handful of the logical structures which are called "theories". What exactly is a scientific theory?
Somewhat difficult to read: Frederick Suppe, "Theories, scientific". in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998).


• Carl Hempel once remarked, "The establishment of a general theory of confirmation may well be regarded as one of the most urgent desiderata of the present methodology of empirical science. Indeed, it seems that a precise analysis of the concept of confirmation is a necessary condition for an adequate solution of various fundamental problems concerning the logical structure of scientific procedure." What is the task of a theory of confirmation, and why is it important? Explain why the general approach that ought to be taken to this task is still very much a matter of dispute, in the process sketching at least two of the widely adopted general approaches and indicating how they fall short.
Quick and easy: Theo Kuipers, "Confirmation theory" in E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (London: Routledge, 1998). and Patrick Maher, "Confirmation Theory" in Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2/e Macmillan Reference USA 2006.