Tufts Metaphysics Comp Answers

The following is a study guide to the Tufts Philosophy MA Metaphysics Comp. Questions are listed, when possible, with a source which provides a direct answer and which can be understood "quickly and easily". Sometimes, we have only resources that provide more "in-depth" coverage---these articles may be more challenging, and it may be difficult to fit many of them into the 48-hour window you usually have to prepare answers.

Related pages include:
      General Tips
      Philosophy of Science
      Epistemology
      Ethics

If you know of a reference that provides a clear and concise answer to any Tufts Metaphysics comp question, email me or post in the comments!

• Are there any good arguments for or against a four-dimensional ontology?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 6.
In-depth: Michael Rea, "Four-Dimensionalism," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 246-280.


• Why might someone deny that the past exists? If it does not, how can we admire Socrates? What makes it true that there were dinosaurs?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 6.
In-depth: Thomas Crisp, "Presentism," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 211-245.


• What is the point of invoking possible worlds when discussing modality? What must possible worlds be like if it is to succeed?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 5.
In-depth: Theodore Sider, "Reductive Theories of Modality," in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 180-208.


• If there are properties, what are they like? Does this show that there aren’t any? Is there any alterative to positing properties? and another question Things are similar in various ways, and our thought and language is capable of generality. What accounts for these facts? and another question What is an abstract entity? How do abstract entities differ from concrete ones? Are there any abstract entities? and another question Is the nominalist’s ontology of concrete particulars enough?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapters 1-2.
In-depth: Chris Swoyer, "Properties", in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• What is the best version of the argument for the non-existence of God based on the problem of Evil? Does it succeed?
Quick and easy: Derk Pereboom, "The Problem of Evil," in William E. Mann, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 148-70


• The death of correspondence theories of truth has been widely heralded. What exactly is a correspondence theory of truth, and why would someone be tempted to hold such? Why are such theories supposed to be untenable? Are they?
Quick and easy: Marian David, "The Correspondence Theory of Truth", in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• Some contemporary philosophers are “fictionalists” about mathematical objects; others are fictionalists about possible worlds or literary characters. What is fictionalism about a kind of object? How does it differ from instrumentalism (about the sort)? Evaluate reasons for and against fictionalism with respect to some particular sort of object?
Quick and easy: I suggest just focusing on fictionalism about possible worlds, because this article is so comprehensive: Daniel Nolan, "Modal Fictionalism", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• What relation must my beliefs and desires have to my choices, and my choices to my actions, if my actions are to be reckoned to be free?
Quick and easy: Timothy O'Connor, "Free Will", in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy


• Could two substances be perfect qualitative duplicates? What does this show about substances?
Quick and easy: Michael J. Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. (New York: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 3.


• Can conceptual analysis help us discover metaphysical truths?
In-Depth: Frank Jackson, "Armchair Metaphysics", Philosophy in Mind, ed. John O'Leary Hawthorne and Michaelis Michael, Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 60, Kluwer, 1994, pp. 23-42. Reprinted in Mark Richard, ed., Meaning (New York: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 317-337.


• Are all ontological disputes ultimately merely verbal?
In-Depth: Theodore Sider, "Ontological Realism", forthcoming in David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman (eds), Metametaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2007)


• To what extent should a metaphysical theory respect our pre-theoretic intuitions?
  
In-Depth: Timothy Williamson, Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement


• Do macroscopic objects cause anything? If so, is there pervasive causal overdetermination? Does it matter if there is?
Quick and easy: Theodore Sider, What's So Bad about Overdetermination?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003):  719-726


• What is the relation between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made?
In-depth: Kit Fine, "The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter"