Academic goals for this semester

Well, the semester is beginning tomorrow. As usual, I am excited, and when I get excited I get optimistic about all the things I am going to accomplish. Here's a prioritized list, just so I have a record of my ambition that I can laugh about in December.

1. Finish my writing sample.

   This is going to be a ~15-page version of my work on truthlikeness, which began as a 25-page paper for a class and burgeoned into a 95-page thesis (which I just turned in last week) to complete my MA in Theology at SWBTS. Here's what it's about.
   
   It is a common belief among scientists that: while all of our scientific theories are incomplete and are wrong in places, science is generally progressive. In particular: newer theories are generally "closer to the truth" than the theories they replace. But what does it mean for one theory to be "closer to the truth" than another theory? Karl Popper thought, roughly, that it means that the new theory has more true consequences and less false consequences than the old theory. It may surprise you that, in 1974, this idea was proven to fail. This is, in fact, one of the very few knock-down, drag-out [i.e., conclusive] disproofs I've encountered of a significant and initially plausible philosophical idea.
   
   Since then, logicians and philosophers of science have been trying to put together a workable definition of "closer to the truth". As you'd expect, there's a whole lot of disagreement among them. I try to argue that we can appeal to the scientific practice of statistical hypothesis testing to show that one of the definitions (by Finnish philosopher Ilkka Niiniluoto) is better than the others.
   
   A good introduction to all this is Graham Oddie's article on the subject, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

2. Apply to PhD programs.

   Right now, I have ten programs in mind. Listed in alphabetical order, they are:

   • Harvard University
   • New York University
   • Princeton University
   • Rutgers University, New Brunswick
   • Stanford University
   • University of California, Irvine
   • University of California, Los Angeles
   • University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
   • University of Notre Dame
   • University of Pittsburgh

   This list isn't perfect: for one, I'm not sure whether to include Columbia University. But I think the app, transcript, GRE, etc. fees already add up to over $800, and I've got to stop the hemorrhaging of cash somewhere. Perhaps I will refine this list when the 2007 Philosophical Gourmet Report comes out in November.

3. Finish my incomplete.

   I've been thinking about perception for almost a year now, but I still haven't been able to write a paper on the subject yet. The basic task I've been focussing on is giving an analysis of our concept of perception, to explain what we mean when we say that we are perceiving something. [Since I'm focusing on our concept of perception and not its nature, this will limit, but not eliminate, the relevance of our scientific investigation of perception. Common folks can employ the concept of perception just fine without lots of specialized scientific knowledge, and I'm interested in the ordinary usage of the concept.] One answer I'm highly attracted to is a theory called the causal theory of perception. Obviously, to perceive an object o, one must have a sensory experience of o. To this, the causal theory of perception adds a claim: that it is necessary for o to cause this sensory experience. This much seems right to me, but there are two problems I am worrying about.
   
   First, any sensory experience is going to have an entire chain of causes. Nuclear fusion in the sun causes light to be produced which travels to earth, bounces off the tree, is focussed by my cornea, excites rods and cones in my retina, sending a signal through my optic nerve which creates neural patterns in my brain. Out of all of these causes, it is the tree which I see. How do we pick out the perceived object from all these causes?
   
   Second, there are all sorts of causal chains which end up with our having beliefs about objects. I can feel depressed and think of my dead dog: but even if it really is the death of my dog which caused my depression, I'm not perceiving the dog, am I? A.D. Smith suggests a situation where my having a headache makes me think of my mother. Says Smith: "I should not, however, thereby be perceiving my mother---even if she were indeed present, and even if she had somehow caused the headache" [Smith, The Problem of Perception, p. 74]. I agree. So what is it about some causal chains (like the one involving the tree) which allow them to result in perception, while other causal chains (like the one involving the headache) do not?

4. Take Phil 167, Science Before Newton's Principia

   I put this near the end, but this is what I am most looking forward to this semester. It will let me get back into physics, as it covers the history of celestial mechanics that led up to Newton. It will also expose me to enough history to help me decide how much of a historical emphasis I want to include in my PhD work.

5. Audit Phil 121, 131, and 195

   OK, this is where I'm going a bit nuts. But there are just too many classes that look so interesting. And useful.

6. Take the metaphysics and philosophy of science comps.

   The Tufts MA in philosophy has two requirements: pass nine classes (including logic) and four comprehensive exams. They don't give out reading lists or study guides of any sort for the comps: they only provide lists of past test questions. You have to figure out on your own how best to answer the questions. It seems to me that students should share their work to help each other pass these things: to put together a list of resources for answering previous test questions, along with outlines of answers that cover some basics. I'm going to try my best to do this while I do my own preparation. If all goes well, I'll have a few documents to post on this website....